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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Justin Daniel

Bowman

appeals from the district court’s denial 0f his pro se motion t0

dismiss, claiming speedy trial and double jeopardy Violations.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

state

And Course Of The Proceedings

charged

Bowman

with

possession

telephone harassment, and two counts of attempted strangulation.
court appointed the

On
Bowman’s
away

the

County Public Defender

Falls

t0 represent

morning 0f May 23, the second day of trial, the

public defender, Marilyn Paul,

last night.”

Bowman’s

Twin

(Tr. V01.

I,

THE COURT:

Bowman.

district court

The

district

(R., p.24.)

received

word

that

Another deputy public defender appeared 0n

and the prosecutor had the following discussion:

I’ve called the

to the prosecution what’s

(R., pp.76-78.)

was “not present today because her husband passed

p.4, Ls.18-21.1)

behalf; he, the court,

misdemeanor

of methamphetamine,

Bowman

case just for informal purposes t0 convey

happened.

Iunderstand that other than the fact that Ms. Paul’s husband has passed away, you
probably have no information or any other knowledge of what’s going 0n in this
case, I’m assuming.

[DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER] ESSMA: N0,

THE COURT:

Okay. A11

n0.

right.

Ms. Harrington, have you had an opportunity t0 speak with anybody from the
how you want to proceed 0r—

public defender’s ofﬁce t0 determine

1

In this brief the state adopts

V01. I” refers t0 the
III” refers to the

transcript.

May

Bowman’s convention of referring

t0 the transcript

volumes: “Tr.

23 trial transcript, “Tr. V01. II” refers to the June 10 hearing, “Tr. V01.

June 28 hearing, and “Tr. V01. IV” refers t0 the August 23 sentencing hearing

[DEPUTY PROSECUTOR] HARRINGTON:
Essma very brieﬂy

this

morning.

going to keep going, so

I

Your Honor,

realize that there’s simply

I

imagine that

we would have

I

spoke with Mr.

no way

to jointly

that this is

move

for a

mistrial at this point in time.

THE COURT:

Okay. That will be the Court’s

intent.

Any objection, Mr. Essma?
MR. ESSMA: No

THE COURT:
bring

him

I

objection.

will note that

It’s

up.

Mr.

Bowman

a scheduling order, and

not present.

is

it’s

an issue

There

that’s

is

no time

to

beyond anybody’s

control.

Rule 29.1, this trial is—a mistrial is
appropriate. Ms. Paul’s husband has passed away, and there’s clearly n0 way that

So

I

Will

ﬁnd

that pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal

anybody could
(Tr. V01.

I,

p.5,

step in t0 proceed in this

trial.

L.12 — p.6, L.2.) The court granted the parties’ joint motion for a mistrial and set

the case for a status conference in June. (R., p.179.)

Thereafter,

court.

Bowman, who was

(R., pp.180-83.)

still

represented

by counsel,

sent several pro se letters to

These included Bowman’s pro se “Motion for Mistrial,” ﬁled 0n

May

30. (R., pp.180-81.)

On

June

10, at the ﬁrst status conference after the mistrial,

With Ms. Paul. (Tr. V01.

family,

I

II,

The court

p.4, Ls.8-9.)

did declare a mistrial,” meaning

Bowman’s

attorney agreed.

date and neither

On

(Tr. V01.

Bowman nor his

June 21,

Bowman

II,

“we

just

Bowman was

reiterated that “[d]ue t0 a loss in

need

p.4, Ls.12-13.)

Which

The court suggested an October

8 trial

letter

With the

II,

(R., p.185.)

Bowman

also wrote, in an

p.6, Ls.2-3.)

district court.

Citing the Idaho Code, he wrote that “I have the right to a speedy

arraignment.”

Ms. Paul’s

t0 reset this matter for trial,” t0

attorney had an objection. (Tr. V01.

ﬁled another pro se

present in court

trial

unsworn statement,

(R., p.185.)

Within 6 months of

that

“had the courts

informed” him of the circumstances surrounding the mistrial, he “would have insisted 0n
proceeding with

The

pro se.” (R., p.185.)

district court

speedy

Bowman’s

addressed

Ms. Paul noted

p.4, Ls.13-19.)

that his

trial

trial rights

Bowman

that

a June 28 status conference. (Tr. V01.

letter at

“Wished

t0

have

this status

III,

conference set in order

might be discussed,” but because she was “representing Mr. Bowman,

she [would]” present the issue to the court.

(Tr. V01.

p.4, Ls.17-23.)

III,

Ms. Paul framed the

issue as follows:

Mr.

Bowman was

arraigned in January of this year, and

July
by my
you might want t0 examine that.
has not waived his speedy trial rights.

period runs,

23rd.

calculations,

calculations,

I

Will also note, as the Court

necessitated t0 be declared

circumstances in

my own

However,

I

believe his speedy

anyone

would note

differs

also that

trial

the trial as

Mr.

Bowman

that a mistrial was
was going forward due to

life.

And

it

for that,

I

have apologized

in discussing the rescheduling

of

this trial,

it

was determined

four-day setting would be more appropriate than a three-day setting, and

it

necessary t0

move

to

Mr.

and the schedule.

with that assessment based 0n the previous

found

trial

with those

and counsel are well-aware,

upon

personal

Bowman for interrupting his

I

If

trial

as

it

I

that a

agreed

developed, and so the Court

the setting 0f that length into,

I

believe, the October

timeframe.

And

so that

assert his

(Tr. V01.

III,

To

p.4,

is

Why we’re

speedy

here before the Court today. Mr.

trial right,

as far as

I

Bowman

does Wish t0

understand.

L.25 — p.5, L.18.)

assess whether the delay

would amount

to

a speedy

trial

Violation,

the court

considered “the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion 0f his or

her right to a speedy

The

trial,

and the prejudice occasioned by the delay.”

district court, clarifying that

speedy

trial

would run on July

13,

(Tr. V01.

III,

p.7, Ls.8-15.)

concluded that based on

those factors,

Ls.13-14.)

it

The

would be “impossible”
district court also

In this matter,
days.

made

hold

to

trial

before then. (Tr. V01.

III,

p.8, Ls.23-24; p. 10,

a record of the factors leading up to the delay:

we had proceeded

in the

trial.

This was a

trial that

was

set for three

There were a number of evidentiary issues, complicated evidentiary issues,

Which were presented

t0 the

Court the morning of

trial.

The Court

actually

delayed calling in the jury in order to take up those issues.

We then proceeded With the

ﬁrst day of trial, and the State’s primary Witness, the

Ms. Paul was in the midst 0f her
was after recessing for the ﬁrst
day 0f trial that Ms. Paul received—later that night 0r the next morning When Ms.
Paul—the situation arose With the death 0f her husband, and so proceeding with
Ms. Paul was an impossibility.
alleged Victim in this case,

Essma

was 0n

when we broke

cross—examination

the stand, and
for the day.

It

emergency hearing that the Court had
extemporaneously with Ms. Harrington and Mr. Essma. The defendant was not
present due t0 the fact that there were a number of issues that all 0f the courts
were trying t0 accommodate With respect to the Public Defender’s Ofﬁce that
morning, and the Court at that time declared a mistrial upon Mr. Essma’s
application for a mistrial and the State’s joinder 0f that—of that motion.
Mr.

I

appeared

should say that that

was nobody

With the case, and so

At

is

else in the

that time, the

it

at

an

also based

ofﬁce

upon Mr. Essma’s acknowledgment

Who was

would have been an impossibility

t0 proceed.

Court then declared the mistrial, and that’s

ourselves in the position today With the approaching speedy
frankly, an impossibility

on July—or by July

And

I’ll

that there

familiar With the case 0r able t0 go forward

on the Court and counsel

to

trial

Why we ﬁnd
date and, quite

be prepared t0 try

this case

13th.

just say candidly at this point,

would you be able
Court were t0 set it prior t0

Ms. Paul,

that

prior to the 13th,

t0 put together

case if the

the 13th?

even

if the trial

were

an adequate defense in

set
this

MS. HARRINGTON: [sic] Iwould make my best efforts, Your Honor, but this is
a case that involves many witnesses and difﬁculty in securing the attendance of
some of them,
(Tr. V01.

III,

The
squeeze

p.1

1,

L.3

so that in and 0f itself would be a barrier.

— p.12,

district court

L.17.)

then asked

Bowman

this in” before July 13, that his

if

he understood

that, “if the

Court were to try t0

“defense would be severely hampered in the ability to

get, ﬁrst

of

that date,”

your attorney prepared and t0 get any Witnesses that you want available prior t0

all,

which

clariﬁed With

Bowman

Bowman:

prior to the 13th, are

indicated he understood.

“[e]ven if the Court were to

you saying

that

(Tr. V01.

III,

make arrangements

you would want

t0

The court

p.12, Ls.18-24.)

have

t0

this

g0 forward, despite the

matter heard

fact that

your

witnesses might not be available and that your attorney might not be prepared to proceed

f0rward?,” Which

district court

found that

“it

maintained

Bowman afﬁrmed

would be

even though he

is

Bowman

it

stating otherwise.”

from October

The

“exerted

to the defendant’s

attempted t0 accommodate

bumping

he would.

district court

Bowman’s

8, to

August 27.

turned t0

[sic]

Bowman

“No,

I

that point, the

however, the court

trial rights”;

The court nevertheless

p.13, Ls.10-14.)

III,

request,

and adjusted the previously—set

(Tr. V01.

III,

p.13, L.15

(Tr. V01.

(Tr. V01.

— p.14,

se,

III,

Which

p.15, Ls.3-9.)

without counsel,”

0r motion, if you want to call

it

I

that, to

want

it

date—

interpreted as

But When the court

Bowman

Bowman

p.15, Ls.9-13.)

III,

trial

L.25.)

se letters t0 the court,

coincides with exactly what we’re discussing here today and

III,

To

p.13, Ls.4-9.)

(Tr. V01.

whether he wanted “to proceed pro

instead he had a “letter

speedy

[his]

Bowman’s pro

don’t want t0 proceed pro se.”

III,

extreme detriment t0 proceed prior to [July] 13th,

“expressing dissatisfaction With his counsel.”

asked

(Tr. V01.

responded,

indicated that

submit to the Court that

t0 put

0n record.”

(Tr. V01.

p.15, Ls.14-17.)

The court allowed Bowman
(Tr. V01.

III,

p.17, Ls.2-3.)

that the mistrial

and went pro

Prior t0 doing so,

was unavoidable;

se.” (Tr. V01.

Bowman, now

t0 “read [his letter] 0r just tell it” the court

III,

as

Bowman

Bowman

put

it,

“I

explained that

letter,

was

“actually not true”

could have represented myself that day

p.17, Ls.7-15.)

quoting directly from his

it

on the record.

elaborated:

I

hereby

move

mistrial

was declared ex

process,

my

I

it

attorney or

participate

to

constitutional rights

And

my constitutional rights through due
my Sixth Amendment right to

self.

was not made aware of the

opportunity

the

parte in Violation of

notice to be present or to be heard, and

representation, be

Why

With prejudice as jeopardy has attached and a

to dismiss the case

day of the

situation the

the

in

decisions

trial

and been allowed

my

regarding

furthermore, such conduct

is

outside of the Court’s authority, given the

nature of the circumstances that day, and the proper course of action

(Tr. V01.

“t0 proceed pro se that

V01.

p.18, Ls.7—10.)

III,

to

— p.18, L.7

p.17, L.19

III,

day with

He

district court

This

Court

trial”

it

argued

“the course of action

was

my constitutional rights.”

(Tr. V01.

asked Bowman’s counsel t0 weigh

was not made known

[letter]

Bowman

(quoting R., p.187).)

I

me

to

until

I

in,

III,

that,

me

of the

had he been asked

would have chosen.”

further asserted that because “these choices

the court’s actions “violated

The

would have

court—I was ready and down the hall—and inform
and ask me how I Wished t0 proceed.

been to bring
situation

me

substantive

beyond me.

is

were not offered

to

(Tr.

me,”

p.18, Ls.20-22.)

and she had the following

to say:

received the ﬁling t0 Which the

earlier referred.

And I would

simply note that as a practical matter, had Mr.

the opportunity to proceed in a pro se fashion With the

Bowman been allowed

trial,

he would have been

impaired in that effort by the lack of ability to locate and be able to produce the
discovery and other exhibits that would be necessary t0 his defense. And Without

me

present, there

was n0 one

in

my

ofﬁce prepared t0 step in and be able t0

him even if he were going t0 be proceeding
would have been his right to have had those materials
available t0 him, and it would have been impossible under the circumstances t0
have provided those to him to be able t0 assist in his defense.
provide that—those materials to
entirely

(Tr. V01.

his

p.19, L.20

III,

The

on

own.

— p.20,

district court

case,” based

It

L.9.)

construed

Bowman’s

on “the Court’s declaration 0f a

recitation of his letter as “a

mistrial.” (Tr. V01.

court ﬁrst admitted that, “perhaps, in retrospect,”

it

III,

should have had

motion

to dismiss this

p.20, Ls.18-19.)

Bowman

The

district

“brought up” t0 be

present for the declaration of a mistrial.

(Tr. V01.

court continued to

ﬁnd the

mistrial

As

earlier,

Mr. Essma requested a

I

noted

was

III,

p.20, L.25

—

p.21, L.3).

Nevertheless, the

appropriate:

mistrial.

Ms. Harrington joined

in that

motion. There was a recognition that there was nobody else in the Public

Defender’s Ofﬁce t0 step in and take over. The Sixth
that in proceeding to trial, that the defendant

Amendment does

require

have the effective assistance of

counsel.

When we

we were in the middle of
which is the alleged Victim.
There were numerous complicated and intricate arguments that morning regarding
the introduction 0f evidence, and at least two 0f those rulings had been taken
under advisement by the Court t0 be taken up at the time that evidence was
offered. Clearly, the defendant would have n0 idea 0n how t0 get that evidence in,
What arguments t0 make, and at Which point t0 get them in.
As

I

noted

earlier,

recessed the previous day,

the cross examination of the State’s primary witness,

As

would not have been able t0
review any 0f the exhibits ahead 0f time, would have not had access to the
exhibits, could not have called in his own witnesses. And so unless he had made
previous accommodations in order t0 get those Witnesses called in, would not
have known where to pick up 0n the cross—examination 0f the witness Who was on
the stand and who had testiﬁed for quite some time several hours the day before.
(Tr. V01.

indicated

III,

The

by Ms. Paul

p.21, L.14

— p.22,

as well, the defendant

L.12.)

district court reiterated that,

but for the mistrial, “the defendant would have been

with ineffective assistance 0f counsel,” and stated

have been convicted had the

trial

its

“abiding belief that the defendant would

proceeded in Ms. Paul’s absence, Whether

counsel or Whether the defendant had attempted to proceed pro se.” (Tr. V01.

Beyond
post hoc

V01.

III,

that, the district court

comments regarding

p.22, Ls.19-21.)

made

The court

him

t0

be quiet.”

(Tr. V01.

III,

it

III,

was With other

p.22, Ls.13-18.)

[Bowman’s] post hoc motion—or

proceed pro se are not made in good

ﬁrst pointed out that,

22, 2019, at 8:52:30 in the record, Mr.

instruct

the “ﬁnd[ing] that

his Willingness t0

Bowman was

p.22, Ls.21-23.)

left

0n

“[t]he

morning 0f the

rather vociferous,

And the

faith.”

(Tr.

0n

May

trial,

and the Court had

to

court noted that, “[n]0netheless,

during his outburst, he indicated, quote,

The

Ls.21-25.)

district court

I

want

“and that

trial,

just a post

this request for a

hoc assertion trying to get

that

even then,

at the

May

III,

From

all this,

—

“letter is

p.24, L.1.)

‘Motion for Mistrial.”’

he would have proceeded pro se

is

not

for the declaration of the mistrial

Based 0n

of the above, the

(Tr. V01.

III,

district court

made

in

and

good

was harmless.

denied

chance t0

not

made

1.)

good

that “the title of’

was

the

Bowman

“this assertion

in

ﬂ

is

fait

.”

Bowman’s

R., p.180-81.)

[Bowman’s] own

because Bowman’s “assertion

faith,”

any error in

(Tr. V01.

Bowman’s

p.22,

proceed pro se

p.23, Ls.3-1

p.24, Ls.14-16;

that

III,

“oral

III,

failing to bring

p.24, L.17

motion

— p.25,

L.1.)

to dismiss.” (Tr. V01.

p.25, Ls.5-7.)

Bowman,

still

represented

by counsel, subsequently ﬁled

the court at the June 28 status conference, in the

To Dismiss.”

the letter that he read aloud to

form of another pro se

letter entitled

“Motion:

(R., p.187.)

The case

later settled,

and

Bowman

jeopardy as well as the issue 0f speedy

2

trial “is

the court concluded that after the mistrial declaration, “it

Bowman up

III,

III,

t0

at” a

June 28 status conference,

The court likewise pointed out

request, in fact, that a mistrial be granted in this case,”

all

have “jumped

he does not want t0 proceed pro se”—more evidence that

in that

p.23, L.17

30 pro se

(Tr. V01.

“not willing or was not

and his desire

t0 dismiss

he would have exerted his right to proceed pro se” during

(Tr. V01.

that

Bowman was

Bowman would

motion

ﬂat out.”

this

matter dismissed.” (Tr. V01.

this

Finally, the district court noted that

“was emphatic

postpone

accordingly found that

desirous of going forward in this matter,” that

delay the

to

North Carolina

V.

reserved the right t0 “appeal the issue of double

trial” as part

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

of his conditional Alfordz plea to a single

count 0f attempted strangulation, and one count 0f possession 0f a controlled substance.
V01. IV, p.10, Ls.16-25; p.14, L.9

t0 15 years,

—

p.16,

L22;

R., p.237.)

The

sentenced

Bowman

With eight years ﬁxed, for the attempted strangulation charge, and a concurrent seven

years, With three years ﬁxed, for the possession charge.

jurisdiction.

district court

(Tr.

(Id.)

Bowman timely appealed.

(R., pp.251-54.)

(R. p.238.)

The court

retained

ISSUES

Bowman

states the issues

Did

I.

on appeal

the district court err

as:

by denying Mr. Bowman’s motion

charges due t0 a Violation 0f his statutory right to a speedy

Did

II.

t0 dismiss the

trial?

by denying Mr. Bowman’s motion t0 dismiss the
a Violation 0f his right to be free from double jeopardy?

the district court err

charges due t0

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The
Is

state rephrases the issue as:

Bowman’s

appeal barred by invited error and his concessions below,

Bowman failed t0 show any error?

10

0r, in

any event, has

ARGUMENT
Bowman’s Appeal

Bowman’s

Is

BV The Doctrine Of Invited Error And His
Alternatively, Bowman Fails T0 Show Any Error
Barred

ﬁrst claim

is

that the district court “erred

dismiss” in light 0f a purported speedy
the postponement 0f the jury

failed to establish

trial

good cause

violated his statutory right to a speedy

the conceded fact that precludes his claim:

his counsel’s stipulated

It is

trial

motion for a

But he makes

(Id.)

Bowman

0n appeal

his pro se

He

this

admits “that the

trial

and

motion

to

argues that

that “the State

argument “mindful [of]”
trial

was postponed upon

mistrial.” (Id.)

“well settled in Idaho” that defendants

court and later argue

by denying

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

trial Violation.

for the delay.”

Concessions Below;

that the ruling

“may

not request a particular ruling by the

was erroneous.”

613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986).

State V. Grifﬁth, 110 Idaho

Bowman was

represented

by

the public

defender (R., p.24), and the court “declared a mistrial upon” his public defender’s “application
for a mistrial

Because

and the

Bowman

State’s joinder

Bowman’s claim

court that

was erroneous.

I,

p. Tr. V01. III, p.1 1, Ls.22-24).

Bowman

t0 delay the trial.

Bowman “would

now

argue 0n appeal

Invited error bars this claim.

also fails at the threshold because

Contrary t0 What

was good cause

(Tr. V01.

concedes his attorney stipulated to the mistrial, he cannot

that the court’s mistrial ruling

below.

of that motion”

argues 0n appeal,

it

hinges on issues that he conceded

Bowman’s

attorneys’

conceded that there

During the June 28 hearing, Ms. Paul explained

have been impaired” by a “lack of

ability to locate

to the district

and be able

t0

produce the discovery and other exhibits that would be necessary t0 his defense”; that “there was

no one

in

my ofﬁce

prepared to step in and be able t0 provide

he were going t0 be proceeding entirely 0n his own”; and that

11

those materials to

“it

him even

if

would have been impossible

under the circumstances to have provided those to him t0 be able to
V01.

III,

p.19, L.24

—

p.20, L.9.)

the second day 0f trial.

When

This mirrors what Deputy Public Defender

the court

I,

p.5, Ls.3-7.)

cause for delaying the

was

trial,

III,

1ife”—that

is,

Essma admitted on

Essma conceded

Ms. Paul

the court

was

correct.

conceded the underlying, obvious good

explicitly

something that everyone was “well-aware” of below: “that a mistrial

necessitated t0 be declared

own personal
V01.

Finally,

(Tr.

presumed Essma “probably [had] n0 information or any

other knowledge 0f What’s going 0n in this case,” Mr.

(Tr. V01.

assist in his defense.”

upon

the trial as

it

was going forward due

away on

her husband passing

t0 circumstances in

my

the eve of the second day of trial. (Tr.

p.5, Ls.5-8.)

Parties

0n appeal are bound by the concessions they make below,

Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017), and

good cause

t0 delay the trial

When

his attorneys

Bowman

cannot argue

State V.

now

that there

enough

was no

below conceded there was. Nor can Bowman’s

pro-se complaints, read into the record at the June 28 status conference (Tr. V01.

p.19, L.14 (quoting R., pp.187-88)), be

Cohagan, 162

t0

undo

III,

p.17, L.19

his attorneys’ concessions below.

—

While

a defendant has separate rights t0 counsel and t0 self—representation, he has n0 right t0 hybrid

m

representation.

United States

V. Halbert,

640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th

Cir.

1981) (“A criminal

defendant does not have an absolute right to both self—representation and the assistance of

same

counsel.”).

By

below—an

ofﬁcial position offered

the

logic, a represented party

by

his

delivered pro se, that claims the opposite.

cannot press hybrid channels of argument

attorney,

and a shadow argument, improperly

Otherwise, parties could easily circumvent this

Court’s rules and “change positions on appeal,” by simply abandoning their attorney’s arguments

and adopting
P.3d

at 663.

their contradictory pro se

Bowman was

arguments instead.

E

Cohagan, 162 Idaho

represented by counsel below and

12

Bowman’s

at

721, 404

attorneys conceded

there

was good cause

him from arguing

t0 grant the mistrial

the opposite

and delay the

That binding concession prevents

trial.

0n appeal.

Alternatively, if this Court reaches the merits 0f Bowman’s speedy trial claim, there

doubt there was good cause t0 delay
Trial counsel’s

delay,

Why

What

there

is?

this trial past the

husband passed away

The

was good cause

p.5, Ls.5-8; p.19,

middle 0f

in the

state additionally relies

for the mistrial

speedy

trial

trial; if

on Bowman’s own

and ensuing delay

E

LC.

for

some

attorneys’ arguments explaining

I,

p.5, Ls.3-7; Tr. V01.

L.24 — p.20, L.9), and adopts and incorporates herein the

Why the

n0

§ 19-3501.

good cause

that is not

(Tr. V01.

detailed, thoughtful analysis, correctly applying the factors in

(1972), explaining

deadline.

is

Barker

V.

III,

district court’s

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514

delay was appropriate and impossible to avoid (Tr. V01.

III,

p.7, L.8

—

p.10, L.3).

Only one of Bowman’s speedy

trial

arguments warrants further comment.

He

argues that

“the mistrial here does not rise t0 the level 0f a legal excuse because, as asserted in his motion,

Mr.

Bowman would have

for the declaration

because

it is

elected to proceed pro se and continue with the

0f the mistrial.” (Appellant’s

unsupported.

would have asked

go to

t0

There
trial

and unsigned by his attorney

is

pro

n0

se.

was n0

Bowman’s improperly ﬁled pro

by an ofﬁcer 0f the

trial

pro

shows

se letters

fails

Bowman

were unsworn

(ﬂ R., pp.187-88), and Bowman’s statements at the June 28 status
III,

court,

p.15, L.3

—

se, as

he belatedly claimed.

698, 702, 390 P.3d 424, 428 (2017).
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p.19, L.14).

do not constitute

substantial evidence in the record t0 demonstrate that

proceeding With the

he was present

p.12 (emphasis added).) This claim

substantial evidence in the record that

conference were likewise unsworn (Tr. V01.
representations, even

brief,

trial if

E

Because “unsworn

‘substantial evidence,

Bowman would
State V.

3”

there

have insisted on

Cunningham, 161 Idaho

And even

if

unsworn statements

we

should be considering

Bowman’s

after—the-fact,

as “evidence” of his state of mind, the clearest expression of

thought, closest in time to the mistrial, can be found in his

Bowman’s
Mistrial.”

feelings about the mistrial

(R., p.180.)

proceeded to

pro

trial

were no mystery—he

May

30

letter.

letters

what

and

Bowman

(R., pp.180-81.)

“Motion

entitled that letter

for

Moreover, despite Bowman’s late-breaking claims that he would have

se,

he “was emphatic”

counsel in proceeding forward.” (Tr. V01.

to

pro se

at the

June 28 status conference that he “Want[ed]

p.23, Ls.21-23.) In other words,

III,

Bowman’s

desire

go pro se coincided perfectly with the moment the mistrial was declared, but vanished

thereafter.

The

district

“assertion that he

and

that

it

Willing 0r

“was

would have exerted

t0

Bowman’s” pro

was “not made

good

in

clear t0 the Court that” at the time of the aborted trial “the defendant

show any speedy trial

Bowman’s second claim on
se

“motion

mistrial that is not justiﬁed

Bowman’s premise
pro se.”

his right t0 proceed pro se”

was not desirous of going forward

Bowman fails

Bowman’s

court accordingly had ample reason t0 conclude that

is

appeal

(Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

is

necessity.”

fails

p.24, L.1.)

when

right to

He

it

denied Mr.

retrial after

a

(Appellant’s brief, p.14 (emphasis altered).)

be present in order t0 exercise his right t0 proceed

reasons that, “[b]ecause the district court abused

allow” continued prosecution following the mistrial, which, per

This argument

—

p.23, L.3

that the district court “erred

discretion in declaring a mistrial” outside 0f his presence, “there

jeopardy Violation. (Appellant’s

III,

because the double jeopardy clause prohibits

by manifest
had a

(Tr. V01.

was not

Violation.

t0 dismiss

that “he

in this matter.”

fait ,”

was n0 manifest necessity

Bowman, amounts

t0 a

its

t0

double

brief, p.22.)

on several

fronts.

analysis even applies here, because, as his

First,

own

14

Bowman

fails t0

show a double jeopardy

citations point out, “[u]nlike the situation in

which the

trial

has ended in an acquittal or conviction,

criminal proceeding

is

retrial is

not automatically barred

When

a

terminated without ﬁnally resolving the merits of the charges against the

accused.” Arizona V. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). Moreover,

Bowman’s own

cited

authority holds that the narrow exception t0 this rule—the “manifest necessity” test—only

applies

where the defendant does not consent

if the ﬁrst trial

was prematurely terminated by

due t0 ‘manifest necessity.”

moved

for

it.

Bowman

set forth in

Bowman’s

V. Perez,

Thus, because the
consent, Via his

Ma_nley even applies.

trial

own

142 Idaho

Second, even assuming

Bowman’s

at

when

is

960 (2005)

Who

represented him, jointly

“was prematurely terminated by the

attorney’s motion, he fails to

344, 127 P.3d at 960.

show

the exception

The general

and continuing the jury

district

trial

rule applies

did not even

at 505.

should be performing a “manifest necessity” analysis, and

physical presence

concedes 0n appeal that there
“[t]his

we

retried

22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)).

Bowman’s double jeopardy rights. Washington, 434 U.S.

asking whether

may be

the district court, without the defendant ’s consent,

instead: “retrial [was] not automatically barred” here,

implicate

criminal defendant

consented t0 the mistrial—his attorney,

(R., p.179.)

court,” but with

“A

State V. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 344, 127 P.3d 954,

(emphasis added, quoting United States
Here,

to a mistrial:

somehow

n0 Idaho authority

factors into the calculus,

that supports his position.

Bowman

As he

puts

it,

Court has not yet ruled on Whether a defendant has a constitutional right t0 be present

the district court declares a mistrial.”

outlier here;

Bowman

shares, in

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

two jam-packed

Idaho

is

not some lonely

footnotes, jurisdiction after jurisdiction that

have concluded either that “a defendant does not have a right

t0

be present” for the declaration,

or that has n0 “right t0 consent to a mistrial.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18, n.5, n.6.)
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Nevertheless,

Bowman

maintains “that this case should be the exception to the rule.”

But because n0 controlling authority supports Bowman’s purported

(Appellant’s brief, p.18.)

right t0

be present for a mistrial declaration

decline

Bowman’s

was keen

invitation to start carving out exceptions into settled law.

make new law

to

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief, pp.17-20), this

in this area, this

case—with

its

court should

Even

if this

Court

wealth 0f procedural bars to appellate

review, and factbound claims that are better tackled 0n post-conviction—is a clunker of a vehicle

for blazing

new trails on direct

Third, even assuming

cloth,

and

we

Bowman’s claim

moved

Bowman’s exception

is

Bowman’s

Bowman’s argument

retrial,

that the district

personal input.

for the mistrial,

“abused

m,

This claim, like

110 Idaho

at

Bowman’s

Bowman present

But Bowman’s own attorney

(ﬂ Tr. V01.

Bowman now

ﬁrst claim,

is

the mistrial motion

I,

p.5,

L.12 — p.6, L.2),

claims led to the double jeopardy

therefore barred his

own

invited error.

614, 716 P.2d at 1386.

makes

it

Whether there was manifest necessity
the

by granting

(Appellant’s brief, pp.21-22.)

and did so Without

Fourth, if this Court

making

be created from whole

again barred by invited error.

is

discretion”

its

inviting the purported “abuse of discretion” that

Violation.

t0 the rule should

should ask Whether his absence from the mistrial declaration had any effect 0n the

“manifest necessity” for a

Without

appeal.

to the merits

t0 continue the trial here,

manifest necessity determination,

information to enable

it

of a “manifest necessity” analysis, and asks

a district

it is

court

t0 consider alternatives t0 a mistrial

plain that there was.

ought t0 obtain sufﬁcient

and give counsel a timely and

meaningful opportunity t0 be heard 0n the subject.” Ma_nley, 142 Idaho
(emphasis added).
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“In

at

345, 127 P.3d at 960

A11 of these factors are present here.

Bowman’s

counsel, the deputy public defender, had

“a timely and meaningful opportunity t0 be heard on the subj ect” of whether t0 continue the

Li.

And Bowman’s

for the mistrial.

were n0

(Tr. V01.

I,

alternatives to a

Bowman’s own
trial;

counsel readily agreed he was not prepared to go to

p.5,

trial,

L.12 — p.6, L.2.)

Bowman’s

no other attorney was prepared

impossibility to proceed” with the

to

move

manifestly plain on this record,

and jointly moved

district court

concluded there

based 0n information that was beyond sufﬁcient (and that

attorneys conceded):

was manifestly necessary

Moreover, the

trial,

trial.

t0 step in

trial.

the

counsel’s husband passed

(Tr. V01.

trial.

on her
III,

p.1

behalf;

1,

L.3

—

and

“it

away in

the middle of

would have been an

p.12, L.4.)

In other words,

Because the necessity of moving Bowman’s

Bowman fails to show

it

trial is

any double jeopardy Violation 0n appeal.

CONCLUSION
The

state

respectfully requests this Court

Bowman’s motion to

DATED this

afﬁrm the

district

dismiss and afﬁrm the judgment 0f conviction.
16th day 0f July, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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court’s

order denying
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